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applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) macro fundamentals were sound in the wake of the
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Abstract
We develop a model that captures important features of debt crises of the Brazilian type. Its
applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) macro fundamentals were sound in the wake of the
crisis (e .g., a non-negligible primary surplus, a relatively low debt/GDP ratio, low in￿ation, etc.);
and (2) the trigger for the crisis appears to be the forthcoming elections, with an expected regime
change.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Brazil public ￿nances appeared to have been in shambles prior to the election in October 2002. The IMF
accord from August 2002 gave Brazil a critical boost, providing the central bank with a total additional
$16 billion in international reserves to defend its weak currency and thereby to contain the explosion
of dollar-linked public debt service.1 The package also includes a promise to increase the loan to $30
billion, if the primary surplus is increased. Three-quarters of Brazil￿s debt is in domestic currency,
and around a third of this debt is indexed to the dollar. Therefore, the policy challenge was not only
the strength of Brazil￿s currency, but also the level and volatility of domestic interest rates. Because
most of Brazil￿s local currency debt is short-term, and thus eﬀectively indexed to the rate of interest,
Brazil seems to have been vulnerable to self-ful￿lling-expectations reversals in capital ￿ows, with the
country￿s risk ratings at the centre of the equilibrium shifts. Indeed, since the presidential elections
∗This note was written while the two authors visited the Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU) at the University of
Copenhagen.
￿The Mario Henrique Simonsen Professor of Public Finance, Tel-Aviv University, Research Associate, NBER and
Research Fellow, CEPR.
￿The Henry Kaufman Professor of International Capital Markets and Research Fellow, CESifo.
1Although only $6 billion of the new IMF loan were available in 2002, Brazil￿s central bank will have more ￿exibility
after the accord. The agreement cuts to $5 billion (from $15 billion) the minimum level of reserves it promises to hold.
Thus, in eﬀect, there is an additional $16 billion the central bank can use to defend the currency.
1in October 2002, which brought to power the leftist Workers￿ Party that has a history of anti-market
sloganeering, the new government has worked to reassure the markets that Brazil would pay its debts,
curb its budget de￿cits and reduce in￿ation. By March 2003 Brazil￿s currency has appreciated and the
risk premium that investors demand for holding Brazilian debt has dropped signi￿cantly (from more
than 20 percentage point in October 2002 to 10 percentage points by March 2003). Did credit rating
institutions contribute to an overreaction by the markets in the runup for the Brazil￿s 2002 election?
The Economist (February 8th, 2003), though in a domestic regulation context, describes the potential
circularity associated with ratings as follows:
￿As ratings have been more widely used in regulation, they have begun to aﬀect the market,
in a version of Goodhart￿s law (that any variable chosen as a monetary-policy target immedi-
ately starts to behave diﬀerently). Because regulators and banks use ratings to assess credit
risk, a rating downgrade can itself become a trigger requiring higher interest payments from
a borrower or even driving it into bankruptcy. Similarly, rather as teachers often teach to
the test, ￿nancial instruments are increasingly designed solely to carry a particular rating,
not the other way round."
In this note we rationalize the sort of circularity involved in credit rating. Our main purpose is
to develop a simple, textbook-like exposition of how could country credit ratings bring about unstable
macroeconomic behavior, and to explore its implications for ￿scal policy.
The main diﬀerence between this note and Razin and Sadka (2001) are: (1) Investment behavior
in the former is new-classical, whereas investment behavior in the latter is subject to a costly state
veri￿cation to accommodate for potential defaults (Townsend (1979)). (2) Fiscal policy implications
are pursued in the former but not in the latter. (3) The main insight to be obtained from this note
comes from a simple diagrammatic analysis, and the main argument is not hidden, perhaps, behind
the algebra. This note is also related to Velasco (1996). His model, however, deals with a diﬀerent
macroeconomic phenomenon, and thus has also diﬀerent ￿scal policy implications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model; Section 3 discusses the phenomenon
of self-ful￿lling credit ratings; and Section 4 points to corrective policies. Section 5 concludes.
2A T e x t b o o k M o d e l
Consider a small open economy that borrows in the world capital markets at a rate r which includes
a country-speci￿c risk-premium. Suppose that the initial stock of capital of a representative ￿rm is
2(1 − δ)K0, where δ i st h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o na n dK0 is previous period capital. With this stock at
hand, the ￿rm invests at present so as to adjust its capital stock to K in order to maximize its value.
This gives rise to a Bellman equation as follows:




F(K) − [K − (1 − δ)K0]+
1
1+r
αV [(1 − δ)K]
¾
, (1)
where F is a production function, V is a value function, t is a current (distortionary) tax, and α is a
parameter which captures expected future corporate taxes. Naturally, higher future taxes should reduce
α. The ￿rst-order condition is given by:
(1 − t)F0(K)=r + δ +( 1− α)(1 − δ), (2)
provided that K>K 0.
Why should V 0(.)=1 ,as implied by Equation(2)? The derivative of the maximand in Equation (1)




(1+r)αV 0[(1 − δ)K]=0
Diﬀerentiating equation (1) totally, using the ￿rst-order condition (The Envelope Theorem):




(1+r)αV 0[(1−δ)K]}dK+(1−δ)dK0 → V 0[(1−δ)K0]=1 .
Thus, the derivative of the function V￿(.) must always be equal to one.
Because investment is irreversible no new investment occurs when
(1 − t)F0((1 − δ)K0) <r+ δ +( 1− α)(1 − δ) (3)
The country￿s credit rating is external to our (identical) competitive ￿rms, and depends on some
aggregate (macro) economic variablesthat characterize the macroeconomic state of the country. Suppose
that these macro variables are two. The ￿rst variable is the growth prospect of the economy as measured
by the private stock of capital (K). The second variable, the ￿scal stance of the government, as measured
by the primary surplus of the government. The higher the surplus, the less likely that the government
will have to raise taxes in the future (that is, the higher also is α). Accordingly, we assume that the
country-speci￿c interest rate is a decreasing function of both K and α :
r = r(K,α). (4)
3Equation (4) is admittedly ad-hoc. But, this relationship is of a more general validity. It captures
plausibly country risk rating based on aggregate macro variables, which yields a macroeconomic exter-
nality. It seems that this macroeconomic externality can be rationalized also in a more microfounded
relationship of this sort.
Given the current ￿scal stance of the government, and the implied future taxation as captured by
α); equations (2) [or condition (3)] and (4) equations (1) and (2) jointly determine r and K. This is
illustrated in Figure 1. Equation (2) is depicted by the curve AB (recall that F is concave in K).
Equation (4) is depicted by the curve E1E2E3H.
There are potentially three equilibrium points - at E1,E 2 and E3. We can ignore the equilibrium
at E2, as it is not Walras-stable: If the stock of private capital rises above K∗, then r = r(K,α) falls,
and each ￿rm will tend to further increase its capital stock, moving further away from the equilibrium;
a similar divergent process occurs if K falls below K∗.
We refer to the equilibrium point at E1 as the ￿bad" equilibrium. At this equilibrium the interest
rate r[1 − δ)K0,α] is ￿high", above (1 − t)F0(K0) − δ − (1 − α)(1 − δ), so that no ￿rm will choose to
invest at all as indicated by condition (3). We refer to the equilibrium at the point E3 as a ￿good"
equilibrium, in which (1 −t)F0(K∗∗)=r(K∗∗,α)+δ +( 1−α)(1−δ) and ￿rms invest to increase their
capital stock to K∗∗.
3S e l f - F u l ﬁlling Credit Ratings
Our textbook model can now be used to highlight the problem of self-ful￿lling credit ratings. Suppose
that the economy is initially at the ￿good" equilibrium: Private Domestic Investment is relatively high
and the country-speci￿c risk premium is relatively low. However, triggered by extrenous shocks the
country may switch abruptly from this ￿good" equilibrium to the ￿bad" equilibrium. This may happen
if some political factor serves to coordinate and to redirect market expectations. Such a political
factor can be, for instance, an emergence of a rookie candidate for presidency whose future policies are
uncertain in the eyes of international investors. Creditors then shift their beliefs about the country￿s
credit worthiness and that would shift the market as well. These beliefs (that the country is at high
credit risk) then become self-ful￿lling. And, indeed, the country￿s investments dry out.2
2See Razin and Sadka (2001) for a similar mechanism that creates boom-bust equilibria. See also Calvo (1988) for an
analysis of multiple equilibria associated with public debt service.
44 Corrective Policies
A possible remedy is to raise the primary surplus. This would reduce future taxes, increase α and shift
the curve E1E2E3F downward to E0
1E0
3. If the primary surplus is raised by cutting spending rather than
by raising current taxes (in this case t does not change), then the increase in α shifts out also the curve
AB to A0B0. In this case, the ￿bad" equilibrium (and also the unstable equilibrium) may disappear
completely. Despite the initial decline in the country￿s credit rating that made the country land on the
bad eqilibrium point E1, the country moves to a new ￿good" equilibrium with an even better credit
rating and more investment. If, however, the primary surplus is raised by increasing current taxes and
not by cutting spendings (that is, by increasing t), then the curve AB need not shift out at all. In this
case, all three equilibria may remain, and the country is still vulnerable to self-ful￿lling credit rating
crunches.
Thus, raising the primary surplus as such is not necessarily a corrective policy for the Brazilian-type
debt crisis. It is corrective if spendings are cut, but not if taxes are raised.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The simple model captures key features of the Brazil-type debt crisis. Its applicability to Brazil lies in
two common features.
￿ Both in the model and in the case of Brazil, the macro fundamentals were not shaky (e.g., the
primary surplus in Brazil in the wake of the crisis was around 2.25 percent of GNP).
￿ Both in the model and in the Brazilian case the ￿coordinator" of market expectations that shift
the market outcome is extraneous to the economic fundamentals of the economy. In Brazil
the expectations-￿coordinator" appeared to have been forthcoming elections with a possibility
of regime change.
Recently, To tackle the crisis Brazil raised its primary surplus target to 3.75-4.25% of GDP.
Whether Brazil can return to robust growth seems to crucially depend on whether lower interest rates
could be restored, as in our model.
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Figure 1: The Stock of Private Capital and the Country-Specific Interest Rate
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